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whether from 'unconscious ideas,' or 'association,' or 'dispositions,' or a 'self,' or a set of physiological functions. Our author has chosen to appeal to biology; to make consciousness a part of the response to, the reaction upon, a need, an unfulfilled function of the organism. The particular physiological powers invoked, the appeal to 'inmost nervous centres,' to 'neural momentum,' 'inclination,' 'disturbance,' etc., will hardly pass unchallenged by the physiologist, but the general procedure is legitimate and leads, moreover, to interesting and valuable results—if only these results be not confused with psychology as a whole. It leads to valuable results because consciousness, considered as a set of functions, performs at least a part of its work in the service of the organism and if it is thus considered, entirely without reference to the organism, the functions lose much of their significance.

Mr. Spiller's conception of consciousness as *habitual function* is deserving of notice. For him, consciousness appears, not in a moment of organic hesitation or indecision, where organization is insufficient for a presented emergency, but, on the contrary, as the expression of a ready-made and preformed process of reaction. Thinking is, on this theory, habituated reaction, and not essentially new adjustment or even delayed adjustment. "To act as we have acted before, is normal to all life," and "thought is the reproduction of what is relevant." It is not easy to reconcile this position with the commonly accepted view which correlates consciousness with readjustment, makes delayed reaction responsible for mental development, and discovers in learning the criterion of mind (*cf.* W. James, *Psychology*, I, 142; M. F. Washburn, *Phil. Rev.*, XIII, 622).

The psychology of *The Mind of Man*, may be called 'reactionism' in contradistinction to 'representative atomism.' In place of direct psychophysical analysis, it offers a series of combined 'systems' which appear as functional adjustments. Thought and action come as the answer to certain needs that have been laid upon the organism by the conditions of life. Reactionism—especially interesting at present because of its relation to pragmatic doctrine—and atomism imply complementary procedures in psychology. The former deals with psychophysical responses to organic demands; the latter analyzes consciousness into 'elements,' which it correlates with relatively simple forms of physical stimulus. The one emphasizes organic conditions of mind; the other, extra-organic conditions. The one refers consciousness back to functional habits of response; the other refers consciousness back to a world of physical objects playing upon the sensitive organism. The one emphasizes activity; the other analysis. The one exalts organic tendency to the neglect of external influence; the other exalts physical causes and conditions to the neglect of organic and organized response. Only a synthesis of the two positions can give a complete and adequate account of mind whether of man or of any other conscious creature.

Mr. Spiller has added to his book a good index and an extensive bibliography which is, however, neither complete nor representative of the whole field of psychological literature.

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I. M. BENTLEY.

Principles of Physiological Psychology by Wilhelm Wundt; translated from the fifth German edition by EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER; Vol. I, pp. xvi+347. London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1904. Price \$3.00..

The debt of English speaking psychologists to Prof. Titchener, already considerable, has been materially increased by the publication of the first volume of his translation of Wundt's monumental *Grund-*

züge der physiologischen Psychologie. Translation, to a man capable of good original work, is a heavy and sometimes unjustifiable sacrifice, but Wundt easily accessible to any one who can read English is something worth considerable sacrifice and something for which the translator's colleagues will not fail to be grateful.

That we have not had a translation long ago is not Prof. Titchener's fault. In 1890-91 he had already completed one of the third edition, but not before a fourth was in prospect. In 1899 again a complete translation of the fourth edition was given over in view of the present fifth edition. The translation now published is a fresh one of the entire work, the others having been wholly discarded. Such an experience is hard for the translator, but gets its reward in the quality of the final product.

The original fifth edition of the *Grundzüge* consists of three volumes (pp. 553, 686, 796) and an index (pp. 134). The first volume of the translation covers 338 pages of Vol. I of the original, embracing the "Introduction" and "Part I: On the Bodily Substrate of the Mental Life," together with a ten-page section on "Pre-psychological Concepts" which is found in the fourth edition but not in the fifth, and a volume index of names and subjects.

As a matter of course the work has been carefully and conscientiously done. In point of training, experience and sympathy Prof. Titchener is uniquely fitted for his task. Translator's footnotes have been added sparingly: in some cases for the special rendition of difficult terms, in others for references to English versions of works cited (*e. g.*, to Jowett's Plato), in still others for bringing the statements of the text into harmony with recent discoveries in embryology and neurology. Perhaps the utter impossibility of turning Wundt's German into intelligent English by a literal translation, perhaps the enforced revisions of the English version, perhaps the translator's veteran skill, perhaps all of them together, have made the style less angular than that of Külpe's manual some years ago, and therefore much pleasanter reading—a point of no small importance in a work of this kind.

It is hardly necessary to add that the psychologist who has not already facile use of a copy of the original should possess himself of the translation, even if he should have to suspend his subscription to the *American Journal* to purchase it!

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RECENT LITERATURE ON THE PATHOLOGY OF DEMENTIA PRÆCOX.

The feeling that there must exist an anatomical basis for the production of various psychoses, will perhaps explain the recent studies devoted to this end in dementia præcox. Kahlbaum has already reported at length the results of seven autopsies in katatonia, in which the microscopic examination was negative, while Alzheimer and Nissl in the same disease found a neuroglia increase, especially in the deeper layers of the cortex. W. R. Dunton (*American Journal of Insanity*,